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The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas  
Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China
Szymon Kardaś
The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies 
to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many 
years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, 
ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields 
(Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction 
in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in 
the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on 
the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal en-
gagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information con-
cerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been 
revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for 
Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use 
the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). 
However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected 
from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term eco-
nomic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and 
US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport 
infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of 
profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally 
binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the finan-
cial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese 
prepayments for gas supplies). 
The history of the talks and the reasons for 
the long duration of the negotiation process
The signing of the 30-year contract ends the 
long negotiation process initiated in the 1990s. 
The negotiations gained momentum in the mid-
dle of the first decade of the 21st century. Gaz-
prom and CNPC signed a strategic co-operation 
agreement in October 2004, and an export pro-
tocol envisaging annual gas supplies at 68 billion 
m3 – via both the eastern route (38 billion m3) 
and western route (30 billion m3) starting from 
2011 – was signed during President Putin’s visit 
to Beijing in March 2006. In October 2009, Gaz-
prom and CNPC signed a framework agreement 
setting the basic terms of gas supplies. This 
agreement set the precise volume and supply 
commencement date, the quantity of natural 
gas covered by the take or pay clause, the supply 
increase schedule, and the value of guaranteed 
payments and gas delivery point at the border, 
among other terms. Many of the documents 
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signed later reiterated provisions which had al-
ready been agreed upon, and thus created the 
pretence of progress in negotiations that was 
necessary for image-building purposes1. 
The lengthy negotiation process was primar-
ily a result of the fact that China’s negoti-
ating position had been steadily strength-
ening. On the one hand, forecasts predicting 
a rapid increase in demand for natural gas in 
China coupled with a large but still insufficient 
domestic output are stimulating China’s inter-
est in importing gas from Russia. However, on 
the other hand, the dynamic changes taking 
place in regional gas markets (for example, the 
shale gas revolution in the USA and its impact 
on forecasts for demand and pricing) were mak-
ing the Chinese side more and more assertive. 
Furthermore, the Chinese gas strategy, a key 
element of which is successive import growth 
based on the diversification of supply sources 
(contracts guaranteeing supplies at 85 billion m3 
from Central Asia and the construction of new 
LNG terminals), further strengthened Beijing’s 
position in negotiations with Moscow. Russia’s 
ever stronger determination (especially since 
Vladimir Putin took power) to sign the publicly 
announced contract was an additional factor 
operating to the benefit of CNPC. This made it 
possible to announce success in the implemen-
tation of one of the key guidelines of Russian 
energy strategy for the gas sector, namely the 
diversification of export markets. 
1 In 1994, CNPC and the Russian Ministry of Energy signed 
a memorandum envisaging the construction of a Russian 
gas pipeline running to China. The Eastern Siberian Kovyk-
tinskoye gas field was to serve as the raw material base 
for this pipeline. In June 1997, an agreement under which 
it was planned to sign a 30-year contract for supplies of 
25 billion m3 of gas was signed during Prime Minister Cher-
nomyrdin’s visit to Beijing. Since Gazprom did not own any 
gas fields in Eastern Siberia at the time (Gazprom took over 
the Kovyktinskoye field, which had been owned by TNK-BP, 
in 2011), it was decided in 1998 to consider in the negotia-
tion process the scenario under which supplies would be 
carried out via the planned Altai gas pipeline, which was 
to run from Russian gas fields in Western Siberia to Xin-
jiang (a north-western province of China). J. Henderson, 
S. Pirani (ed.), ‘The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets are Driv-
ing Change’, Oxford University Press 2014, pages 217-220. 
Gazovoye piar-meropriyatiye, http://www.ng.ru/econom-
ics/2013-09-06/4_gazprom.html (accessed on: 16 May 2014).
The supply volume and the raw material base 
It was announced in March 20132 that Gazprom 
and CNPC had provisionally agreed that the vol-
ume of gas supplies from the Eastern Siberian 
fields would ultimately reach 38 billion m3 annu-
ally. According to sources who have close links 
to the negotiators, Gazprom will be obliged to 
supply a total of around 82 billion m3 of gas 
during the first five years, i.e. around 16.4 bil-
lion m3 annually (based on estimates from Vne-
shtorgbank3, the maximum level of supplies will 
be achieved in 2024). However, representatives 
of Gazprom and CNPC have not yet officially 
confirmed this information. In turn, Gazprom’s 
CEO announced after the contract had been 
signed that the total contractual supply volume 
is 1.032 trillion m3, and supplies are planned to 
commence in 2018 (the parties have reserved 
the right to unilaterally delay the implementa-
tion of the contract by two years4).
The raw material base for Russian supplies to 
China will be formed by two production cen-
tres: the Irkutsk centre (the Kovyktinskoye field 
with gas deposits at 1.5 trillion m3 and ulti-
mate annual output at 35 billion m3) and the 
Yakutia centre (the Chayandinskoye field with 
2 Larger supplies were planned at an earlier stage of the 
negotiations. In September 2009, the parties entered into 
a framework agreement setting the basic terms of gas sup-
ply (68 billion m3 annually), which was supplemented one 
year later when an expanded version of the basic terms 
of supplies was signed (legally binding document). This 
volume of supplies would be possible to achieve, if two 
gas export routes were used: the eastern (38 billion m3) 
and the western (30 billion m3 exporting gas to China 
from the Russian gas fields located in Western Siberia).
3 ‘China gas breakthrough’, FSU Energy, vol. XIX, 20, 22 
May 2014, page 1. 
4 V kontrakte Gazproma s Kitayem predusmotreno smesh-
cheniye nachala postavok, http://www.vedomosti.ru/compa-
nies/news/26938871/kontrakt (accessed on: 30 May 2014). 
The long duration of the talks was primar-
ily down to China’s strengthening negoti-
ation position.
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gas deposits at 1.2 trillion m3 and ultimate 
annual output at 25 billion m3). According to 
an announcement made by the Federal Agen-
cy for the Use of Natural Resources in 2010, 
the Chayandinskoye field was planned to be put 
into operation in 2016. It was stated in March 
2014 that the launch of gas production would 
be postponed: it would commence at the 
Chayandinskoye field no earlier than 2019 and 
at Kovyktinskoye field no earlier than 20245. 
One day after the contract was signed, the CEO 
of Gazprom ordered work to be carried out in 
order for the Chayandinskoye gas field to begin 
production towards the end of 2018. 
The promised acceleration of preparations does 
not guarantee that Gazprom will fulfil its con-
tractual obligations to the full extent in the first 
years of the contract’s implementation. Given 
the fact that the initial production launch date 
designated for the Chayandinskoye gas field 
has been shifted from 2017 to 2019, the output 
of 16.1 billion m3 that was envisaged in 2018 is 
likely to be reached no sooner than 2020, and 
could not be further increased to 25 billion m3 
until 2024 or 2025. In the case of the Kovyk-
tinskoye field, the output in the initial period 
(2024) will reach around 3.4 billion m3 and 
could be increased in the best case scenario up 
to 30 billion m3 after no less than fifteen years 
of the field’s operation. Furthermore, the de-
velopment of new sites will require substantial 
investments: around US$13.5 billion in the case
5 Gazprom planiruyet vvesti v ekspluatatsiyu Chayan-
dinskoye mestorozhdeniye ne raneye 2019 goda, http://
itar-tass.com/ekonomika/1017851, (accessed on: 15 May 
2014); Gazprom planiruyet vvesti v ekspluatatsiyu Chayan-
du v 2017 g., Kovyktu – v 2024 g., http://www.oilcapital.ru/
upstream/219764.html (accesses on: 30 May 2014). 
of the Chayandinskoye field and around US$11- 
-15 billion in the case of the Kovyktinskoye field6. 
It cannot be ruled out that in order to comply 
with its contractual obligations Gazprom would 
have to employ other Eastern Siberian gas fields 
(for example, the Chikan gas field located close 
to Kovykta or the gas fields in Krasnoyarsk Krai 
– however, this would require additional trans-
port infrastructure to be built to connect them 
to the Kovyktinskoye field) or the fields located 
in Sakhalin (it is possible to supply up to 30 bil-
lion m3 of gas via the Sakhalin – Khabarovsk – 
Vladivostok pipeline). 
The supply price
The price of Russian gas supplied to China was 
one of the key problems in the long-lasting ne-
gotiations. China wanted the contract price to be 
based on the price applicable at the US Henry Hub 
(traditionally, the prices at this gas hub are among 
the world’s lowest; the average annual gas price 
there in 2013 was US$135 per 1000 m3 as com-
pared to US$390 per 1000 m3 on European spot 
markets). In turn, Gazprom insisted on adopting 
a formula based on the JCC (Japanese Crude 
Cocktail) index, where the average gas price in 
2013 ranged between US$524 and US$582 per 
1000 m3. It was announced during the negotia-
tion round held in June 2013 that the price for-
mula would not be linked to Henry Hub. In turn, 
it could be concluded from declarations made in 
September 2013 by Sergey Kupriyanov, Gazprom’s 
spokesman, that the parties would adopt an ‘in-
novative’7 formula based on LNG prices, which are 
linked to oil prices, and in effect a final gas price 
at around US$346 per 1000 m3 had been set.
6 ‘Nezaprogrammirovannoe razvitie’, http://gasweek.
ru/index.php/sobytiya/rossiya/522-nezaprogrammiro-
vannoe-razvitie (accessed on: 30 May 2014); http://
kommersant-irk.com/uchenye-predlozhili-strategiyu/ 
(accessed on: 30 May 2014). ‘Gazprom obyavil konkurs 
na nazvaniye gazoprovoda Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivo-
stok’, 30 October 2012, http://www.oilcapital.ru/trans-
port/183493.html (accessed on: 10 May 2014). 
7 ‘Gazprom nachnet stroitelstvo “Sily Sibiri” tolko posle pod-
pisaniya kontrakta s Kitayem’, http://www.oilcapital.ru/
transport/214303.html (accessed on: 15 May 2014); ‘Gaz-
prom davit na Evropu Kitayem’, http://www.gazeta.ru/busi-
ness/2013/09/05/5639305.shtml (accessed on: 17 May 2014). 
The development of the new fields will re-
quire substantial investment.
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When the contract was signed, Gazprom’s CEO 
announced that the price formula was covered 
by trade secret and added that the total value 
of the 30-year contract was US$400 billion. Oth-
er members of the company’s managerial staff 
further revealed that the gas price was linked 
to LNG and Diesel oil prices. In turn, President 
Putin announced that the price formula was 
constructed in a similar manner as the formu-
las used in Gazprom’s contracts with most Eu-
ropean customers (linked to the prices of oil and 
the basket of petroleum products)8. Meanwhile, 
the media9 reported that the base price oscillat-
ed between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3.
Although no precise statement concerning the 
price formula adopted in the contract has been 
issued, it can still be concluded, considering the 
information revealed and the context of the 
negotiation process10, that the price formula 
adopted will bring more economic benefits 
to the Chinese side. A price ranging between 
US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3 (a compari-
son of the announced contract value of US$400 
8 ‘Formula tseny na gaz dla Kitaya sformirovana po analogii 
s formuloi na gaz dla Evropy – Putin’ http://www.oilcapital.
ru/export/242788.html (accessed on: 26 May 2014). 
9 Gennady Timchenko admitted that the price set under 
the contract between CNPC and Gazprom was lower than 
the prices set under Gazprom’s contracts with European 
customers but still advantageous to both parties. In turn, 
the Minister for Energy Alexander Novak announced at 
the international economic forum in Saint Petersburg 
that the price was close to US$350 per 1000 m3. ‘Kontrakt 
s Kitayem povliyayet na tseny na gaz dla Evropy – Miller’, 
http://www.oilcapital.ru/export/243153.html (accessed 
on: 25 May 2014); ‘Tsena gazovogo kontrakta mezhdu 
Gazpromom CNPC nizhe evropeyskoy, no vzaimovygod-
na, schitayet Timchenko’, http://www.oilcapital.ru/ex-
port/242927.html (accessed on: 24 May 2014). 
10 Its long duration and Russia’s determination to strike the 
deal, one proof of which was President Putin’s personal 
engagement in the final phase of the talks conducted 
at the time of his official visit to Shanghai.
billion and the total contracted supply volume 
at 1.032 trillion m3 gives an average price equal 
to US$387 per 1000 m3)11 would be, given the 
present situation on the Asian gas market, near-
ly 50% lower than the price of gas imported by 
China from Qatar (around US$680 per 1000 m3 
in 2013). This price would be similar to the prices 
set in Gazprom’s contracts with European cus-
tomers (the average price in 2013 was US$380 
per 1000 m3) and in CNPC’s contracts with Turk-
menistan (around US$360 per 1000 m3). 
A gas price at this level could mean that Gaz-
prom would have to carry out supplies to China 
below the break-even point. The company’s rep-
resentatives have pointed out that supplies from 
the Chayandinskoye field can remain profitable 
as long as the gas price is not lower than US$400 
per 1000 m3 on the Russian-Chinese border. 
Considering the expected fiscal preferences 
promised by the Russian side the implementa-
tion of this project could be barely profitable to 
Gazprom (on the first day of his visit to Shang-
hai, President Putin announced that Russia was 
ready to reduce to zero the rate of the mineral 
resources extraction tax (NDPI) for the gas fields 
which would serve as the raw material base for 
supplies to China, and this would bring down the 
break-even point to US$370–380 per 1000 m3)12. 
The cost-effectiveness of this project became 
even more dubious after the statement issued 
by Vladimir Putin on 4 June 2014 during a meet-
ing of the presidential Commission for Strategic 
Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector and 
Environmental Security: the Russian president in-
structed the government to consider recapitalis-
11 However, this would be an overly simplified calculation, 
which fails to take into account possible changes in the 
values of other parameters forming part of the undis-
closed price formula. 
12 Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich expressed the 
government’s initial approval of the preferences being 
granted during the behind-the-scenes talks in Shanghai. 
‘Rosnefti tesno v Rossii’, Vedomosti, 23 May 2014. How-
ever, the Minister for Economic Development, Alexey 
Ulyukayev, suggested in his statement that the Ministry 
of Finance would have to conduct a financial analysis 
of this; http://www.oilcapital.ru/export/242885.html 
(accessed on: 26 May 2014). 
The information revealed and the context 
of the negotiation process indicate that 
the price formula adopted will be more 
beneficial to China.
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ing Gazprom due to the expenses it would have 
to incur in connection with the implementation 
of the contract signed with CNPC13. 
The supply route, the transport 
infrastructure and the construction costs
At the beginning of the negotiation process, 
the parties were considering two basic vari-
ants for the transport of Russian gas: (1) via the 
western route – from Western Siberia to the 
north-western regions of China and (2) the so-
called eastern variant – from the Eastern Siberian 
fields to the north-eastern regions of China. The 
latter variant was finally chosen in March 2013 
as part of the memorandum signed by CNPC 
and Gazprom. Gazprom is planning to build 
a new pipeline, the Power of Siberia14, for this 
purpose. This gas pipeline will be approximately 
4000 km long and will consist of two sections: 
(1) Yakutia – Khabarovsk – Vladivostok (around 
3200 km) and a branch running to China from 
Blagoveshchensk, (2) Irkutsk Oblast – Yakutia 
(around 800 km). The new pipeline’s planned 
capacity is 61 billion m3 annually15. The gas 
pipeline’s location will partly overlap with the 
route of the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) 
oil pipeline. It is planned to be put into opera-
tion in late 2018/early 2019. Although Gazprom 
made the final investment decision concern-
ing the construction of the Power of Siberia 
pipeline in October 2012, signing the contract 
with CNPC was the necessary precondition 
to make the implementation of this invest-
ment possible. According to initial estimates, 
the pipeline’s construction cost will reach
13 ‘Zasedaniye komissii po voprosam strategii razvitiya 
TEK i ekologicheskoi bezopasnosti’, http://kremlin.ru/
news/45831 (accessed on: 5 June 2014).
14 The pipeline’s name was chosen as a result of an open 
contest in December 2012. 
15 Although it has been suggested over the past few months 
that it could be increased to 65 billion m3 (statement by 
the Russian Minister for Energy, Alexander Novak, in Oc-
tober 2013) and even to 68 billion m3; http://energo-news.
ru/archives/113566 (accessed on: 12 May 2014). 
US$25 billion, i.e. almost half of the expenses 
planned as part of the Eastern Gas Programme16.
Gazprom’s investment programme for 2014 
does not take the Power of Siberia into ac-
count17, and its engagement in other expensive 
infrastructural projects (South Stream, the LNG 
terminal construction in Vladivostok and in-
vestments in gas assets in Western Europe) may 
make it even more difficult to generate funds 
for the implementation of the Eastern Gas Pro-
gramme. However, the company’s determina-
tion and political support from Vladimir Putin 
himself will be decisive for the launch of this 
new Russian flagship investment. Part of the 
cost (US$20–25 billion) will be incurred by the 
Chinese side as part of the prepayment for gas 
supplies. Still, neither the detailed conditions of 
this prepayment nor its precise allocation have 
been agreed as yet, a fact confirmed by Gaz-
prom’s CEO18. Another stimulating factor is the 
interest expressed by pipeline manufacturers. 
One proof of this is the fact that the tender for 
the supply of pipeline components for the new 
gas pipeline, which was announced by Gaz-
prom in June 2013, has already been settled. 
16 The Eastern Gas Programme envisages the implementa-
tion of upstream projects, in particular the development 
of fields in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, construction 
of transport infrastructure and the implementation of 
LNG projects. According to Gazprom’s plans from Feb-
ruary 2013, the total value of investments to be made 
as part of the programme is US$60 billion. President Pu-
tin announced on this occasion that the total cost of the 
investment (infrastructure and field operation) to be in-
curred by both parties would reach around US$70 billion.
17 Given the fact that supplies are expected to commence 
within four or five years, Gazprom will have to invest in in-
frastructure on average around US$11.2–14 billion annually. 
18 ‘Gazprom podtverdil soglasovaniye avansa po gazovomu 
kontraktu s CNPC v obyeme $25 mlrd’, http://itar-tass.
com/ekonomika/1208491 (accessed on: 31 May 2014). 
Gazprom’s determination and the political 
support provided by Vladimir Putin will be 
decisive for the construction of the Power 
of Siberia pipeline. 
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OMK, ChTPZ and Severstal, all owned by Yuri 
Kovalchuk, an influential member of the Rus-
sian business elite, won the tender19. 
The deal is overshadowed 
by rivalry in the Russian gas sector 
The fact that the contract has been conclud-
ed will strongly affect the domestic rivalry be-
tween Russian firms operating in the gas sec-
tor. Ensuring access to the Power of Siberia gas 
pipeline apart from Gazprom to the so-called 
independent gas producers was discussed fol-
lowing a motion from Rosneft and the Irkutsk 
Oil Company during a meeting of the govern-
mental commission for the fuel and energy 
sector on 25 February 201420. Igor Sechin, the 
CEO of Rosneft, who is also the secretary of the 
presidential Commission for Strategic Develop-
ment of the Fuel and Energy Sector and Envi-
ronmental Security, made an official proposal 
at the commission’s meeting on 4 June 201421 
for granting them the right to export their out-
put from gas fields in Eastern Siberia and the 
Far East using the pipeline system. 
Rosneft stands a great chance of succeeding with 
its plans. Not only did Vladimir Putin not oppose 
Igor Sechin’s proposal during the discussion (he 
had until then emphasised on numerous occa-
sions in public that Gazprom had to retain the 
monopoly on gas exports via the pipeline sys-
tem) but he also expressed his approval for the 
need to set equal ‘rules of the game’ for all mar-
ket players. Furthermore, the Russian Minister 
for Energy had already announced on an earli-
er occasion that up to 25 billion m3 of gas the 
19 The detailed terms of the prepayment are now being 
discussed as part of consultations. ‘Gazprom pristupit 
k stroitelstvu gazoprovoda Sila Sibiri v noyabre’, http://
www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/14256191/gaz-
promu-malo-trub (accessed on: 12 May 2014). 
20 ‘Gazprom poprosili potesnitsia’, http://www.kommer-
sant.ru/doc/2425211 (accessed on: 10 May 2014). 
21 ‘Zasedaniye komissii po voprosam strategii razvitiya 
TEK i ekologicheskoy bezopasnosti’, http://kremlin.ru/
news/45831 (accessed on: 5 June 2014). 
new pipeline could potentially be supplied by 
Russian ‘independent gas producers’, including 
around 18–20 billion m3 by Rosneft alone. Still, 
Rosneft’s possible success would primarily be 
down to the ever stronger position of Igor Sechin 
among the Russian political and business elite. 
One example of Rosneft’s  successful lobbying 
(in tandem with Novatek) was the act limiting 
Gazprom’s export monopoly adopted in Novem-
ber 2013 (the so-called independent producers 
were granted the right to export gas in liquefied 
form). Furthermore, Rosneft has announced its 
intention to intensify its activity in the gas sector 
and has been successively taking over further as-
sets from Russian gas firms. Its total gas reserves 
in the Eastern Siberian region include around 
1 trillion m3 of gas (first of all, the Yurubcheno- 
-Tokhomskoye field – 387 billion m3 of gas – and 
the Srednebotuobinskoye field – 115 billion m3, 
the latter of which will be jointly operated by 
Rosneft and CNPC). It cannot be ruled out that, if 
Gazprom is unable to supply a sufficient amount 
of gas in the initial period of the contract’s im-
plementation, supplies from the gas fields con-
trolled by Rosneft will help it fulfil its contractual 
obligations (technically, this is possible; however, 
since some fields are located quite far away from 
the planned route of the Power of Siberia, for 
example, Rosneft’s Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye 
field, this will entail significant expenses). A fac-
tor which further strengthens the position of so-
called independent gas producers are the results 
of their bilateral co-operation with China seen 
thus far: the rapid development of Rosneft’s 
co-operation with CNPC and Sinopec in the oil 
sector and the effects of co-operation between 
Novatek and CNPC in the gas sector (the Chinese 
company holds a 20% stake in the Yamal-LNG 
Rosneft and Novatek may be granted the 
right to export gas via the pipeline system.
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project, which has been implemented by No-
vatek in tandem with France’s Total). The grow-
ing position of Gennady Timchenko, who was 
recently nominated head of the Russian-Chinese 
business council and was presented by President 
Putin himself during his last visit to Shanghai 
as the most important person in Russia in charge 
of co-operation with China, may also have 
a strong impact22. 
Gazprom’s prospects on the Chinese 
gas market 
The launch of Russian gas supplies to China fits 
in with the long-term trend characterised by 
the regular increase in gas demand on the Chi-
nese market. According to data published in the 
World Energy Outlook 2013, the gas consump-
tion level in China will grow from 132 billion m3 
in 2011 to 529 billion m3 in 2035. China’s import 
potential will also grow on a regular basis: from 
55.6 billion m3 in 2013 to 212 billion m3 in 2035. 
China’s consumption, own production
and gas import potential (in billions m3) 
1990 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 2030 2035
Consumption 15 132 147,1 176,5 307 396 470 529
Production 15 103 108 120,9 178 218 266 317
Imports - 29 39,1 55,6 129 178 204 212
My own calculations based on: World Energy Outlook 2013
However, considering China’s growing domes-
tic production, import deals struck with Central 
Asian countries (another contract was signed 
with Turkmenistan in September 2013 under 
which supplies were increased to 65 billion m3 
annually) and the rapid development of regasifi-
cation terminals to be used for importing LNG23, 
22 ‘Rosnefti tesno v Rossii’, Vedomosti, no. 91 (3595), 23 May 
2014; ‘Kitay predlozhil Timchenko doli v CPG terminalakh’, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/26841581/ki-
taj-predlagaet-timchenko-doli-v-spg-terminalah-i (accessed 
on: 29 May 2014). 
23 Nine terminals currently operate in China. Their total po-
tential is around 46 billion m3. Four more terminals, with 
a total capacity of around 16,5 billion m3, are planned to 
be put into operation in 2014–2015. 
it is rather unlikely that China will be interested 
in the implementation of other pipeline projects 
with Russia, apart from the eastern one, with-
in the nearest decade24. This means that Gaz-
prom’s declarations that level of its exports to 
the Chinese gas market25 will be comparable to 
that on the European market appear unrealistic 
at this moment. Firstly, the contracted supply 
volume (38 billion m3) is not comparable to its 
exports to the European market (161.5 billion 
m3 in 2013, including Turkey). The Chinese mar-
ket could become more significant for Russia, 
if Russian LNG projects are implemented (ad-
ditional exports of around 41 billion m3 of gas 
in the optimal version, and around 80 billion m3 
in the most optimistic version). However, this 
would require a rapid pace of work to be set 
and investment guarantees to be obtained in 
order to enable the achievement of maximum 
production capacity, and this seems rather un-
likely at this moment. Secondly, Russia may find 
it difficult to gain the position it expects in the 
gas markets of China or other Asian countries. 
While Russia has earned a well-established po-
sition in Europe as a gas supplier as a result of 
decades of co-operation in the gas sector, in 
the case of the Chinese market (or other Asian 
markets) it will have to fight for its expected 
status and face bitter competition with such 
major liquefied gas exporters as Qatar, Austra-
lia, Malaysia and Indonesia, and probably also 
with the USA in the next few years. 
24 On the occasion of signing the contract, President Putin 
announced that talks on building a gas pipeline running 
along the western route from Altai to Xinjiang would be 
resumed.
25 This has been promised on numerous occasions by Gaz-
prom’s CEO, Alexey Miller.
The Chinese gas market will not pose 
a real alternative to Gazprom’s supplies 
to Europe. 
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The meaning of the contract for Russia
The deal is at present important for Russia 
primarily for political reasons. Firstly, it sig-
nifies the realisation of its strategic goal, which 
has been declared for many years, namely the 
diversification of gas export markets. Secondly, 
given the mounting challenges on the Europe-
an market (regulatory challenges posed primar-
ily by the packages which have liberalised the 
EU gas market; possible negative consequences 
from anti-trust proceedings; and the expected 
intensification of EU member states’ efforts to 
lessen their dependence on Russian gas sup-
plies), Russia will try to capitalise on this con-
tract to strengthen its position in talks with the 
EU. The 30-year contract with CNPC will cer-
tainly be used as an argument in response to 
the criticism of long-term contracts heard more 
and more frequently in Western Europe. 
However, the political impact of this contract 
will in actuality be minimal. The launch of gas 
exports to the Chinese market using the pipe-
line system will not represent any comparable 
alternative to the European market – not only 
due to the disparities in the volumes of gas 
sold, but primarily due to the impossibility of 
redirecting gas supplies as part of the pipe-
line system from Europe to Asia. In any case, 
the low price of Russian gas supplies to China 
could be used by European customers to in-
sist on further price reductions from Gazprom. 
However, it is difficult to predict the long-
term economic impact of this contract. 
The difficulty arises first of all due to the lack of 
full data concerning the price formula and the 
uncertainty as to whether CNPC will increase 
its engagement in the Russian upstream sector. 
According to media reports accompanying the 
final negotiation rounds, the Chinese side made 
its consent to sign the contract dependent on 
being granted favourable conditions for invest-
ing in the Russian gas fields (in early April this 
year, Russians offered the Chinese side during 
another round of negotiations the possibili-
ty to invest in the following fields in Yakutia: 
Verkhnevilyuchanskoye – 139.6 billion m3 of gas 
reserves, Srednetyungskoye – 102.7 billion m3, 
Sobolokh-Nedzhelinskoye – 156.2 billion m3 
and Tas-Yuryakhskoye – 64.03 billion m3). 
The terms under which CNPC would be ready to 
make prepayments to Gazprom in order to en-
able the financing of these costly investments 
have not been agreed as of yet. 
The deal, albeit being a further step towards 
intensification of Russian-Chinese econom-
ic co-operation, does in practice accentuate 
the asymmetric nature of this co-operation, 
consistently turning the Russian ‘partner’ into 
an ‘energy vassal’ of China. 
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